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Abstract 
The Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) is a regional group consisting of 15 
countries which was founded 1975 with the goal to promote economic trade, national cooperation, 
and the creation of a monetary union throughout West Africa. This paper empirically assesses the 
determinants of the economic development from 1996-2016 in ECOWAS using panel unit root 
tests, panel cointegration tests, and the estimation of the dynamic panel data regression via the 
Arellano–Bond estimator and Arellano–Bover and Blundell–Bond estimator.  The empirical 
results show total factor productivity (TFP), law, and somewhat corruption are indicative of 
economic growth under the Arellano–Bond estimator.  Under the Arellano–Bover and Blundell–
Bond estimator, the results revealed that inflation, gross domestic saving (GDS), and TFP have a 
significant impact on economic growth in the ECOWAS.  From these empirical results, improving 
economic growth in ECOWAS countries improves the quality of life of people and the government 
of each ECOWAS country become cognizant of the benefits in the implementation of pro-growth 
policies.  The policy implication is that the governments of the ECOWAS countries should give 
policy priority to promote pro-growth economic policies and enhance institutions to enable 
economic growth.    
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1. Introduction
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)1 was established by the Treaty of 
Lagos on 28 May 1975 with the mandate to promote cooperation and integration, which led to the 
establishment of an economic union in West Africa.  The goals for ECOWAS are to raise the living 
standards of its citizens and to promote economic stability, foster relations among member states 
and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent.1 
ECOWAS was founded to achieve collective self-sufficiency for the member states by means of 
economic and monetary union. It was designated one of the five regional pillars of the African 
Economic Community (AEC). Together with COMESA, ECCAS, IGAD, and SADC, ECOWAS 
signed the Protocol on Relations between the AEC and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
in 1998. The goals were to establish a common economic market, a single currency, the creation 
of a West African parliament, economic and social councils, and a court of justice. The ECOWAS 
Secretariat and the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development are its two main 
institutions to implement ECOWAS policies.  
In 2000, five ECOWAS members formed the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) with the 
goal to establish a stable currency whose exchange rate is tied to the euro and guaranteed by the 
French Treasury. The eventual goal was for the CFA franc and Eco to merge, giving all West and 
Central Africa a single currency.  The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the 
determinants of the economic growth in ECOWAS via the panel unit root tests, panel cointegration 
tests, and the estimation of the dynamic panel data regression via the Arellano–Bond estimator and 
Arellano–Bover and Blundell–Bond estimator.   
This paper adds to the literature by showing the importance of pursuing pro-growth economic 
policies and the strengthening of institutions by governments of each ECOWAS country to 
improve the quality of life of people throughout ECOWAS. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 provides a review of some previous studies followed by Section 3 which provides some 
background information about Sub-Saharan Africa and ECOWAS countries. Section 4 discusses 
the data sources and the methodology of this paper.  Section 5 analyzes the empirical results, and 
the last section concludes by providing some useful policy implications. 
2. Literature Review
The review of the existing literature presented an overview of the determinants that affect 
economic growth in ECOWAS countries. Adamu (2013) investigated the impact of foreign aid on 
economic growth in the ECOWAS states via a three-equation simultaneous-equations model and 
panel data from 1990 to 2009. From this paper, it was concluded that the effect of foreign aid on 
economic growth is positive and strong. Other important drivers of economic growth are interest 
rate, FDI, and level of international reserves. A policy implication of this study is that member 
countries of the ECOWAS should seek foreign aid as it would greatly accelerate their economic 
growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) start with some arguments in favor of or against 
democracy.  They concluded that political institutions do matter for growth but thinking in terms 
of regimes does not seem to capture the relevant differences. On the other hand, Chen (1997) 
1 ECOWAS is comprised of fifteen countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
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examined the recent studies of technological change or total faster productivity as a source of 
growth in East Asian countries. His findings showed that even if East Asian economic growth was 
largely input-driven in the past two decades, one cannot preclude the possibility that this will 
change when their economies become more mature. Input-driven economic growth can be 
sustainable.  
Boozer et al. (2010) investigated the two-way relationship between economic growth and human 
development. The work consists of integrating economic growth as well as human development; 
it considers reverse causality between the two as well as the simultaneity. They find that human 
development plays an essential role in determining economic growth. Successful policy requires 
an early focus on human development, not only because of its direct impact, but also because of 
its feedback effect on sustaining economic growth. Gabriel (2013) examined the relations between 
private investment and sustainable economic growth in ECOWAS from 1986 to 2011 using panel 
data cointegration technique. The empirical results showed that private investment does not 
significantly impact economic growth to ensure sustainability in ECOWAS countries. Borrmann 
et al. (2007) performed an empirical analysis of the linkages between institutions, trade, and 
income levels in the ECOWAS countries. The results suggested that institutional quality, an 
important prerequisite for a successful trade liberalization, might help explain why some countries 
observe positive welfare effects of an increase in trade openness, whereas other countries do not 
benefit from trade. A limited number of sub-components of good governance and regulatory 
quality are most important for successful trade liberalization. 
Esso (2010) reexamined the cointegrating and causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth in the ECOWAS countries from 1960 to 2005. He found that there is a 
positive long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth in most of the 
ECOWAS countries and financial reform should promote economic growth. As for governance, 
the FDI, and economic growth in ECOWAS, Raheem (2013) explored the interactive impact of 
governance on FDI in seven ECOWAS countries using OLS and Threshold Auto Regressive 
(TAR) techniques. Using panel data for the period 1970-2010, the findings suggested that FDI is 
positively related to growth in both normal and dynamic effect in the OLS models. Moreover, 
government consumption, balance of payment (BOP), and governance contribute significantly to 
the economic growth in seven ECOWAS countries. Anyanwu and Yameogo (2015) also analyzed 
(FDI) to West Africa using a panel dataset from the same period as Raheem (2013).  Their results 
showed that there is a U-shaped relationship between economic growth and FDI inflows to West 
Africa while domestic investment, trade openness, first year lag of FDI, natural resources (oil and 
metals) endowment and exports, and monetary integration have a positive and significant effect 
on FDI inflows to region. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between FDI inflows 
to the sub-region and loan component of ODA, economic growth, life expectancy, and domestic 
credit to the private sector. Zannou (2009) focused to apprehend factors affecting the importance 
of the ECOWAS intra-community trade flows from 1980 to 2000 using a gravity model. He 
concluded that remoteness and enclosure reduce the volume of intra-community trade while 
proximity (geographical, linguistic, and monetary) increases it. Economic and demographic 
dynamics are sources of increased trade within ECOWAS.   
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In a broader analysis of the economic growth in Africa, Anyanwu (2014) examined the factors that 
affect economic growth in 53 African nations. The analysis applied a cross-country panel data for 
African countries between 1996-2010.  The results from this study indicated that higher domestic 
investment, net official aid, secondary school enrollment, metal price index, government 
effectiveness, and urban population were positively and significantly associated with Africa’s 
economic growth.  Chiwa and Odhambo (2016) investigated the literature bout the determinants 
of economic growth in both developed and developing countries. They concluded that the key 
macroeconomic determinants of economic growth in developed countries include physical capital, 
fiscal policy, human capital, trade, demographics, monetary policy and financial and technological 
factors while in developing countries include foreign aid, foreign direct investment, fiscal policy, 
investment, trade, human capital development, demographics, monetary policy, natural resources, 
reforms and geographic, regional, political, and financial factors. 
While the reviewed papers carefully examined some specific issues affecting economic growth of 
ECOWAS countries, none of them provided an assessment of the determinants of economic 
growth in ECOWAS. A careful assessment of these determinants of economic growth has 
important policy lessons for African policy-makers because the policy-makers need to know what 
policies would result in economic growth in ECOWAS countries. This paper contributed to the 
existing literature by examining the determinants of economic growth in ECOWAS countries by 
looking at economic and institutional variables.  
2.1 Rational and Theoretical Underpinning in the Determination of Economic Growth of 
ECOWAS Countries 
Using a dynamic panel regression, we would examine the determinants of economic growth on 
ECOWAS countries that includes both economic and institutional variables. The empirical 
analysis is based on sound theoretical framework based on the growth theory and augment the 
classical growth model. 
Consider the standard neoclassical production function: Y= f(A, K.L)  where A is the level of 
technology, K is capital stock, L is the quantity of labor and Y is output. Assume that the 
production function is twice differentiable and subject to constant returns to scale which indicates 
that technical change is Hicks-neutral. Differentiation of the production with respect to time, 


















where: Ý/Y is the continuous time rate of growth of output, Ќ/K is the growth rate of capital stock 
and Ĺ/L is the growth rate of labor force; fK and fL are the factors (social) marginal products of 
capital and labor, respectively; and Á/A is the Hicks-neutral rate of change of technological 
progress. Thus, the basic Solow growth model gives the growth rate of output or income, 
depending on the growth rate of technical change, labor or population and capital stock. 
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This basic Solow model has been modified empirically to obtain the augmented Solow growth 
model where the growth rate of income for a given country depends not only on technical change, 
labor and capital but also on policy variables, e.g., trade, fiscal policy, and monetary policy.  
Even though the theoretical model underlying modern economic growth work has moved beyond 
the Harrod-Domar model, determinants of economic still has an impact on growth via capital 
accumulation. To analyze whether economic and institutional variables works through the 
investment link it is necessary to show that economic and institutional variables have an impact 
on economic growth in ECOWAS countries. Accordingly, we formulate a growth regression in 
which real GDP is driven by GDP per capita, trade, total factor productivity and other economic 
variables. In addition, institutional variables also have an impact on economic growth of ECOWAS 
countries and are included in this paper.   
3. Some Stylized Facts about Economic Growth of ECOWAS
ECOWAS is the largest region in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Table 1 displays some economic 
indicators of SSA with an average growth rate of 4-5% for the period of 2000-2010 and an annual 
growth rate of about 5% between 2010 and 2015. However, the net exports contribution to growth 
is negative for the same period except for 2010, and almost zero in 2014 and 2015.  Moreover, the 
Current Account Balance (CAB) and Fiscal Balance (FB) as a percentage of GDP are negative to 
up to -3.3 in 2014 for the CAB and up to -3.9% in 2010. The recent global recession might have 
negatively impacted the CAB and FB of the ECOWAS countries. Table 2 shows that most 
ECOWAS countries experience a growth rate of GDP between 3% and 25.0% for the 2010-2015 
period except the period of civil war where it was negative in Cote d’Ivoire and the Gambia in 
2011 and in Guinea-Bissau as well as Mali in 2012. Sierra Leone records the highest growth rate 
with 25.0% in 2012 followed by Ghana with 14.4% in 2011 and Niger with 12.0% in 2012. Table 
3 displays the negative CAB as a percentage of GDP for all the ECOWAS countries and confirms 
the results from Table 1 for SSA. Table 4 displays the different regional communities in Sub-
Saharan Africa. ECOWAS is the largest region with 15 countries and 340 million people and 
$1322 billion in 2013.  
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Figure 1: ECOWAS - Real GDP Growth vs. Real Non-Oil GDP 
Growth Rate
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Figure 2: ECOWAS - Real GDP Growth, Trade Balance, and 
External Current Account

















Figure 3: ECOWAS - Total Investment vs. Gross National Savings


















Figure 4: ECOWAS - Overall Fiscal Balance (Excluding Grants)
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Figure 5: ECOWAS - Government Revenue, Government 
Expenditure, and Government Debt
Government Revenue Government Expenditure Government Debt
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Figure 1 shows strong growth of real GDP 4-8% for the ECOWAS countries over the 2009-2016 
period. The real GDP growth rate for non-oil ECOWAS countries has been even higher since 2011 
with the drop of crude oil prices below $30 a barrel. The trade balance and external current account 
as a percentage of GDP have been decreasing for the entire period between 2004-2008 and 2009-
2016, and even negative in 2015 and 2016 as shown in Figure 2. The 2007-2008 global recession 
impacted several of the ECOWAS countries which mainly export primary commodities. Figure 3 
displays a decreasing trend for both total investment and gross national savings as a percentage of 
GDP in ECOWAS countries from 2009 to 2014. The trend reverses after 2014 with total 
investment being higher than gross national savings. However, the overall fiscal balance as a 
percentage of GDP has been negative up to -6% in 2009 to finally stabilize around -4% in 2016 as 
shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows the government revenue, government expenditure, and 
government debt as a percentage of GDP with a fall trending for all three variables for the period 
of 2004-2008.The government revenue and government expenditure still fall to stabilize around 
10% and 15%, respectively, from 2009 to 2016.  The government debt starts to rise in 2012.    
4. Method and Data
4.1 Data Sources 
The data source is from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank covering the 
years 1996-2016, inclusive. The variable of total factor productivity index is from the Penn World 
tables. Table 1a summarizes the economic variables used in this study. As for the variables related 
to the indicators of governance and institutional quality, these data are obtained from the World 
Governance Indicators which are summarized in Table 1b.   
Table 1a:  Economic Variables Used in the Study 
Variable Description Unit 
Real GDP Using national-accounts growth rates, for 
studies comparing (output-based) growth rates 
across countries 
Constant US Dollars 
Inflation Measured by the consumer price index (CPI) 
that reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring 
a basket of goods and services. The Laspeyres 




Calculated as GDP less final consumption 
expenditure (total consumption). 




Calculated as GDP less final consumption 
expenditure (total consumption). Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Current US dollars 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation (Capital) 
Includes land improvements (fences, ditches, 
drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and 
equipment purchases; and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including 
schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
Current US Dollars 
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dwellings, and commercial and industrial 
buildings. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
GDP per Capita The GDP divided by midyear population. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources 
Current US dollars 
Trade The sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP). 
Percent of GDP 
Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) 
Measured total factor productivity (TFP) 
series for each country relative to the U.S. 
(TFP level at current purchasing power parity 
(PPPs)) 
Current PPPs 
Table 1b:  Indicators of Governance and Institutional Quality from the World Governance 
Indicators1  
Variable Name 
(Variable in Paper) 
Description Unit 
A Process in which Governments are Selected Monitored, and Replaced 
Political Stability 
(Political) 
This measure shows perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, including 
terrorism.  
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 





This measure captures perceptions, which the 
citizens in a country can participate in 
selecting their government as freedom of 
expression, the press.  
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 
rank) to 100 (highest 
rank). 




This variable measures the perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service, the quality of policy formulation, 
and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to implement these policies.  
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 




This variable captures perceptions of the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement the appropriate regulations that 
promote the development of the private sector. 
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 
rank) to 100 (highest 
rank). 
 Variables Respecting Citizens and the State for the Institutions that Govern Economic and 
Social Interactions  
Rule of Law (Law) This variable shows the perceptions in which 
people have confidence in and abide by the 
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 
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rules of society, e.g., contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 





This variable measures the perceptions which 
public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by 
elites and private interests. 
Percentile rank term, 
ranging from 0 (lowest 
rank) to 100 (highest 
rank). 
Source:  1http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#doc. 
4.2 Method 
Economic growth entails a dynamic process rather than the static panel data model.  Ignoring the 
dynamics in a model is an omitted variables problem, and careful attention needs to be made to 
the number of lags to include. Before estimating the dynamic panel model, panel unit root tests of 
Levin, Linm Chu (2002) (hereafter, LLC) test and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997) (hereafter, IPS) 
are applied to test if unit roots in these panel data sets are present. After the panel unit root tests 
are applied, Kao’s (1999), Pedroni's (1999), and Westerlund’s (2007) panel cointegration test are 
used to examine the cointegrating relationships that may exist. Then, the estimation of the dynamic 
panel regression model would commence.  
4.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests 
The LLC assumes that each individual unit in the panel shares the same AR (1) coefficient but 
allows for individual effects, time effects, and perhaps a time trend. Lags of the dependent variable 
may be introduced to allow for serial correlation in the errors. The LLC would be considered a 
pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test if lags are included, with 
the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. After transformation via the LLC, the t-statistic is distributed 
as a standard normal under nonstationarity, the null hypothesis. 
Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1997) propose an alternative testing procedure which uses a standardized 
t-test statistic based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics averaged across the 
panels. The t statistic is then formed by an average of the individual ADF statistics, it gained by 
running ADF regressions on each individual time series. Stated differently, IPS is viewed as a way 
of combining the evidence of several independent unit root tests of the variables. 
4.2.2 Panel Tests of Cointegration 
After the determination unit roots, we tested for cointegration to determine if there is a long-run 
relationship in the econometric specification. Pedroni (1999, 2004) developed a test for no 
cointegration in dynamic panel allowing for heterogeneity among the individual regions is 
adopted. In line with the two-step strategy proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), Pedroni extends 
the approach to panels and uses the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron principles. As 
for the Kao panel cointegration test, this test follows the same basic approach as implemented by 
Pedroni and is also in line with the approach by Engle and Granger (1987); however, it specifies 
cross-section specific intercepts and homogeneous coefficients on the first-stage regressors. The 
68 
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final panel cointegration test to be used will be Westerlund (2007).  In the approach by Westerlund 
(2007), the Error-Correction Model is applied in which all variables are assumed to be I(1). Then 
this test examines whether cointegration is present or not by determining whether error-correction 
is present for individual panel members and for the panel.   
4.2.3 Dynamic Panel Regression 
 A lagged GDP as an explanatory variable in a panel regression would cause the fixed effects (FE) 
and the random effects (RE) estimators to be biased. As a remedy for the biased FE and RE, the 
first difference can be applied to the panel data as well as the use of the instrumental variables 
(IV). If a lagged dependent variable is used in a static panel data, there is a correlation between the 
error term, Ɛit, and the lag of GDP.  That is, additional lags would need to be used that do not pose 
a problem in the use of a first difference model (FD). Arellano and Bond (1991) start by 
transforming all regressors, usually by differencing to remove the fixed effects, and use the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) as developed by (Hansen, 1982). The contribution of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) is that it is a test for autocorrelation which is appropriate for linear 
GMM regressions on panels, which is especially important when lags are used as instruments. The 
Arellano–Bover and Blundell–Bond estimator as introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively, augments the Arellano–Bond estimator by making an 
additional assumption that the first differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the 
fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more instruments that can dramatically improve 
efficiency. More specifically, it builds a system of two equations—the original equation and the 
transformed one—and is known as system GMM. The general specification for dynamic panel 
data is   
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝛾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 (1) 
where GDPit is the dependent variable observed for individual i at time t, xit is the time-
variant 1xk regressor matrix, θ is the matrix of the first differences, Ɛi,t is the unobserved time-
invariant individual effect and ui is the error term. OLS cannot be used to estimate (1) because it 
is not consistent. 
A typical complication of panel data would be the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Given the dynamics of the panel regression, the presence of autocorrelation cannot 
be ignored. As the sample size grows, the probability of cross correlations (contemporaneous and 
time varying) also grows.2 
2 The old view to address this problem is to apply the FGLS (feasible generalized least squares), but the application 
of FGLS underestimated the standard errors (Beck & Katz, 2001). Beck and Katz (2009) also ran the panel using 
OLS with a lagged y variable and a fixed effects (FE). It was a good approach, but they never compared their results 
with the GMM suggested by Arellano and Bond.  
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5. Empirical Results
We checked stationarity of data through panel unit root tests. Table 2 presents the results from 
these panel unit root tests for the LLC and IPS as discussed in the preceding section. 
Table 2:  Results from the Panel Unit Root Tests 





Statistic p-value Lags  Conclusion 
 RGDP 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu1 
Intercept 0.4683 0.6802 1 Unit Root 
Intercept and 
Trend -4.0972 0.0000 1 Stationary 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept 5.121 .9999 0 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend 0.0244 0.5097 1 Unit Root 
Inflation 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept -4.0609 0.0000 1 Stationary 
Intercept and Trend -3.3320 0.0004 1 Stationary 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept -4.4222 0.0000 1 Stationary 
Intercept and Trend -2.9123 0.0018 1 Stationary 
GDS 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept -5.5406 0.0000 0 Stationary 
Intercept and Trend -3.0526 0.0011 1 Stationary 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept -5.5772 0.0000 0 Stationary 
Intercept and Trend -6.3552 0.0000 0 Stationary 
GDS$ 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept -0.0658 0.4738 2 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend 0.2063 0.5871 2 Unit Root 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept 3.1438 0.9991 1 Unit Root 
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Intercept and Trend 0.4087 0.6586 1 Unit Root 
Capital 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept 0.1798 0.5731 1 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend -1.5622 0.0591 1 Unit Root 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept 2.3613 .9909 1 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend -0.3548 0.3614 1 Unit Root 
Trade 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept -0.0021 0.4992 2 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend 1.0160 0.8452 1 Unit Root 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept 1.4844 0.9321 1 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend 2.3358 0.9902 1 Unit Root 
TFP 
 Levin, Lin and 
Chu 
Intercept -1.5124 0.0652 2 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend -1.8889 0.0295 2 Stationary 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
Intercept 0.5060 0.6934 2 Unit Root 
Intercept and Trend 0.7745 0.7807 2 Unit Root 
1For the Levin, Lin, and Chu, there are two test statistics reported: The Unadjusted t and the biased Adjusted 
t statistics. The Unadjusted t is a conventional t statistic for testing H0: φ = 0. When the model does not 
include panel-specific means or trends, this test statistic has a standard normal limiting distribution and its 
p-value is shown in the output; the unadjusted statistic, tδ, diverges to negative infinity if trends or panel-
specific constants are included. The adjusted biased t statistic along with its p value is reported here.
2The results were generated using STATA 15. From these results, these tests failed to reject the null of a
unit root at (p<.05).
5.1   Tests of Cointegration 
For cointegration, we applied the Kao test, the Pedroni test, and the Westerlund test. 
Initially, we conducted the Kao test. We, then, applied the Pedroni and the Westerlund 
tests of cointegration as a robustness check to the Kao tests in order to determine if our 
results are sensitive to assumption of cross-sectional dependence. Recall that the Pedroni 
test is residual-based but assumes cross-sectional dependence. On the other hand, 
Westerlund addressed cross-sectional dependence through bootstrapping which is an ad-
hoc way and not a complete solution to take care of cross-sectional dependence. Table 3 
summarizes the results from these cointegration tests. 
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Table 3:  Results from the Cointegration Tests 
Test Statistic p-value
Kao Test for Cointegration 
Modified Dickey-Fuller test 
-5.7016 0.0000 
Dickey-Fuller test -5.1614 0.0000 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
-2.1213 0.0169 
Unadjusted modified Dickey-Fuller test 
-4.8566 0.0000 
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller test 
-4.951 0.0000 
Pedroni Test for Cointegration 
Modified variance ratio -5.4788 0.0000 
Modified Phillips-Perron test 4.5728 0.0000 
Phillips-Perron test -2.367 0.0090 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test -2.2256 0.0130 
Westerlund Test for Cointegration 
Variance ratio 2.0298 0.0212 
Note:  The number of cross sections used in the estimation of these cointegration tests is 15. Also, the number 
of time periods is 19 for the Kao Test, 20 for the Pedroni Test, and 21 for the Westerlund Test. These 
estimates were generated via STATA 15.  
Table of the 3 Kao Test of Cointegration presented the results for the entire panel.  The 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. This is true for the five tests statistics 
reported in Table 3 and provided strong evidence that all panels in the data are 
cointegrated. We wanted to check for the robustness of the results from the Kao test, so 
we estimated cointegration using the Pedroni test of cointegration. The Kao and Pedroni 
tests of cointegration work differently but allow us to come to the same conclusion that 
the panels are cointegrated. Finally, we also applied the Westerlund test which uses 
another approach and one that imposes fewer restrictions. It tests the same null hypothesis, 
but the alternative hypothesis is different, namely that some of the panels are cointegrated. 
The results from the Westerlund test also rejected the null hypothesis of cointegration. 
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5.2 Estimation of the Dynamic Panel Regression 
Table 4 shows the results from the dynamic panel data model using the Arellano-Bond 
estimator with a first difference transformation as the instrumental variable (IV).   
Table 4: Results from the Arellano-Bond Estimator 















































































Results in parentheses are the robust standard errors, and a * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent) 
Table 4 presented several different variations of this model.  Model 1 showed that the one-year 
period lagged GDP is positively related to the contemporaneous GDP which suggested some 
inertia response of GDP to its lag. Consequently, the economic growth of the preceding year could 
significantly and systematically impact the economic growth of the subsequent year. The 
coefficient of 0.91 implied that a one percent increase in the preceding year GDP would lead to a 
0.91 per cent increase in GDP in the subsequent year. For the variable, Gross Domestic Savings 
African Journal of Economic Review, Volume VIII, Issue II, July 2020 
73 
(GDS$), which has a negative sign, indicated that there is a high level of poverty within the 
ECOWAS countries that culminated in low aggregate savings. In addition, the inflation variable 
has a negative sign but is not statistically significant, which probably indicated the tendency for 
inflation to nominally decrease the value of GDP. For the capital variable, this variable depicted 
the amount of physical capital accumulated because capital would be a driver to improve national 
wealth of a nation. The coefficient has a positive sign and is not significant at the 5 percent level. 
The magnitude of the coefficient is quite small and suggested that a one percent increase in capital 
would lead to a small increase in GDP. The law variable represents one of the institutional 
variables that affected economic growth. The sign for this variable is negative and is statistically 
significant at 5 percent, which indicated that as law and order diminishes, then this economic 
growth is hindered. Total factor productivity (TFP) was also added to the model since the literature 
often reveals that TFP serves as an impetus to economic growth (Grosskopf and Self, 2006). The 
TFP has a positive sign and a large magnitude which suggested that a one percent increase in 
productivity would lead to large increase in GDP.  The key for the instrument set in Arellano–
Bond to work is that the differenced unobserved time-invariant component should be unrelated to 
the second lag of the dependent variable and any lags beyond two. If the latter condition is not 
met, then we have a problem of endogeneity. Table 5 summarized this test of serial correlation 
under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
Table 5: Test of Serial Correlation 
Order Test Statistic  p value 
1 -2.3052 0.0212 
2 0.01074 0.9914 
Note:  This test of serial correlation was estimated via STATA 15. 
Based on the results in Table 5, we rejected the null hypothesis no autocorrelation of order 1 and 
cannot reject no autocorrelation of order 2. Consequently, there is evidence that the Arellano–
Bond model assumptions are satisfied. If the order 2 led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, a 
different dynamic panel regression must be estimated. 
In Table 4, model 2 estimated the model without the variables capital/GDP and GDS because these 
variables were embedded into other variables in the model. The omission of these variables yielded 
similar results as model one except for the variable corruption being statistically significant. As 
the level of corruptions is decreased, this enables the government to function effectively and allows 
for economic growth to occur. The coefficient of -0.0069 implied that a one percent decrease in 
the corruption would lead to 0.0069 per cent increase in GDP. As concluded in model 1, Arellano-
Bond AR tests also indicate that there are no problems relating to serial correlation. That is, we 
rejected the null hypothesis no autocorrelation of order 1 and cannot reject no autocorrelation of 
order 2. Model 2 did adhere to the assumptions of the Arellano–Bond model. 
Model 3 as presented in Table 4 removed inflation, GDS, and trade. As indicated in Table 4, the 
variables that were significant in the preceding models are still significant in model 3 except for 
the corruption variable. Also, we the rejected the null hypothesis no autocorrelation of order 1 and 
cannot reject no autocorrelation of order 2 which means that model 3 does adhere to the 
assumptions of the Arellano–Bond model. 
74 
AJER, Volume VIII, Issue II, July 2020, Sissoko and Sloboda 
The results from Table 4 used the Arellano-Bond estimator in which the GMM on the differenced 
model is using a full set of valid lags as instruments. As an improvement of the Arellano-Bond 
estimator, the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator was developed. The Arellano–Bover-
Blundell–Bond estimator made an additional assumption that the first differences of IV are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects (FE). Consequently, this approach allowed for the use of more 
instruments which could lead to improved efficiency. As part of this estimator, it created two 
equations: the original equation and the transformed equation. This system of equations is known 
as a system GMM. Table 6 provides the results. 
Table 6:  Results from Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Estimator 

























































Results in parentheses are the robust standard errors and a * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent) 
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Table 6 presented several different variations of the use of the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
estimator. Model 1 showed that the one-year period lagged GDP is positively related to the 
contemporaneous GDP suggesting some inertia response of GDP to its lag. Consequently, the 
economic growth of the preceding year could significantly and systematically impact the economic 
growth of the subsequent year. The coefficient of 0.98 implied that a one percent increase in the 
preceding year GDP would lead to 0.98 percent increase in GDP in the subsequent year. The 
variable of Gross Domestic Savings (GDS$), which has a negative sign, indicated that there is a 
high level of poverty within the ECOWAS countries that culminated in low aggregate savings. In 
addition, the inflation variable has a negative sign but is not statistically significant which probably 
indicates the tendency for inflation to nominally decrease the value of GDP. For the capital 
variable, this variable depicted the amount of physical capital accumulated because capital would 
be a driver to improve national wealth of a nation. The coefficient has a negative sign, which was 
not expected. In addition, it is not significant at the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is quite small and suggests that a one percent decrease in capital leads to a small 
decrease in GDP.  The law variable represents one of the institutional variables that affects 
economic growth. This sign for this variable is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent 
which indicates that as law and order diminishes, then economic growth is hindered. In addition, 
the regulatory variable shows a positive sign, which indicates that increasing the regulatory 
requirements will increase economic growth. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is small, 
so the effects of the regulations on economic growth would be small. The TFP has a positive sign 
and a large magnitude, and this suggested that a one percent increase in productivity would lead 
to large increase in economic growth.    
Table 6, model 2 estimated the model without the variables GDS and trade because these variables 
were embedded into other variables in the model. The omission of these variables yielded similar 
results as model one except regulatory is no longer statistically significant as in model 1. As with 
model 1, model 2 showed that the one-year period lagged GDP is positively related to the 
contemporaneous GDP which suggests some inertia response of GDP to its lag.  Consequently, 
the economic growth of the preceding year could significantly and systematically impact the 
economic growth of the subsequent year. As for law, it remains statistically significant. The 
coefficient of -0.0011 implied that a one percent decrease in the application of law would lead to 
a 0.0011 percent increase in GDP. As with model 1, the TFP has a positive sign and a large 
magnitude, and this suggested that a one percent increase in productivity would lead to large 
increase in economic growth.    
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this paper, we have combined cross-sectional and time series data to examine the relationship 
between the economic growth and institutional/quality of governance variables in ECOWAS 
countries via a dynamic panel regression. The use of cross-sectional data leaves opens the question 
of spurious correlation arising from non-stationarity and does not permit an examination of the 
direction of causality. On the other hand, the exclusive use of the time series model may yield 
unreliable results due to short time spans of typical data sets. In the first part of the analysis, we 
used panel unit root tests and panel cointegration analysis to conclude that there is fairly strong 
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evidence in favor of the hypothesis that long-run causality runs from the economic variables and 
institutional and quality of governance variables. Once the latter was confirmed, we estimated the 
models via the Arellano and Bond estimator and the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator. A 
policy implication which may be drawn from this study is that ECOWAS countries can improve 
their economic growth performance not only by investing in the traditional sources of growth, e.g., 
investments in physical and human capital, trade and FDI (i.e., Foreign Direct Investment) but also 
by improving their governance performance. More importantly, ECOWAS countries should build 
more schools and hire more teachers in rural areas. They should also use less rules and regulations 
to attract more foreigners to conduct business in West Africa. This will boost more FDI and 
promote more intra and inter trade within and outside the region. In addition, eliminating the taxes 
on imports and exports (i.e., import/export-oriented policy) will promote free trade and hence 
economic growth in West Africa.  
Another policy implication is to improve the quality of the institutions in the ECOWAS countries 
by substantially reducing corruption and misuses of public funds. We believe that a ‘true’ 
democracy with balance of power among the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, ‘free’ 
elections, and alternance in power (e.g., two term limits) will promote the rule of law and better 
governance performance in the ECOWAS countries. Consequently, this can enhance economic 
growth through a very stable political regime with less conflicts and civil wars while encouraging 
more domestic savings and FDI.  
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Appendix 
Table 1: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Forecast Summary (Annual percent change unless 
indicated otherwise) 
Est. Forecast 
00-09a 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP at market pricesb 4.3 5.0 4.5 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.2 
(sub-region totals—countries with full NIA + BOP data)c 
Net exports, contribution to growth -0.3 1.3 -2.9 -0.9 -0.4 0.0 0.4 
Current account bal/GDP (%) 0.1 -1.2 -1.2 -2.9 -3.1 -3.3 -3.0
GDP deflator (median, LCU) 6.7 6.1 8.0 4.1 6.7 5.9 6.0 
Fiscal balance/GDP (%) -0.4 -3.9 -1.0 -2.8 -2.4 -2.1 -1.7
Memo items:  GDP 
SSA excluding South Africa 4.9 6.2 5.3 5.8 6.1 6.0 6.1 
 Oil exporterse 5.5 6.1 4.9 6.0 6.2 6.0 6.2 
 CFA countriesf 3.8 4.5 2.7 5.2 5.2 4.7 4.3 
South Africa 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.3 
Nigeria 5.6 7.8 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.3 
Angola 10.7 3.4 3.4 8.1 7.2 7.5 7.8 
a. Growth rates over intervals are compound weighted averages; average growth contributions, ratios and
deflators are calculated as simple averages of the annual weighted averages for the region.
b. GDP at market prices and expenditure components are measured in constant U.S. dollars.
c. Oil Exporters:  Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo, Rep., Gabon, Nigeria, Sudan, Chad, Congo,
Dem. Rep.
d. CFA Countries:  Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo,
Rep., Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo.
Source:  World Bank.
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TABLE 2: ECOWAS Countries Forecasts – GDP at Market Prices (2005 $) 
(Annual percent change unless indicated otherwise) 
’00-09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 
Benin 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.5 5.0 
Burkina Faso 5.2 7.9 4.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 6.3 
Cape Verde 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 
Cote d’Ivoire 0.8 2.4 -4.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.5 
The Gambia 3.8 6.1 -4.3 3.9 10.7 5.5 5.8 
Ghana 5.0 8.0 14.4 7.5 7.8 7.4 7.5 
Guinea 2.6 1.9 3.9 4.8 5.0 6.0 6.5 
Guinea-
Bissau 
0.9 3.5 5.3 -2.8 3.0 4.6 5.1 
Mali 5.1 5.8 2.7 -1.5 3.5 5.9 6.0 
Mauritania 4.5 5.2 3.9 4.8 5.2 4.9 4.9 
Niger 3.7 8.0 2.3 12.0 6.8 6.1 5.0 
Nigeria 5.6 7.8 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.3 
Senegal 3.6 4.1 2.6 3.7 4.8 4.8 5.0 
Sierra Leone 9.0 4.9 6.0 25.0 11.1 7.6 7.6 
Togo 1.7 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.4 4.6 4.6 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 3: ECOWAS Countries Forecasts – Current Account Balance/GDP (%) 
(Annual percent change unless indicated otherwise) 
’00-09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 
Benin -8.4 -9.4 -9.8 -9.8 -9.0 -7.6 -6.4
Burkina Faso -13.1 -7.0 -0.7 -8.9 -8.3 -7.7 -7.1
Cape Verde -11.3 -12.8 -11.1 -9.9 -8.3 -6.4 -6.4
Cote d’Ivoire 1.9 2.0 0.3 -3.7 -3.9 -4.5 -4.7
The Gambia -3.5 2.0 -16.8 -17.9 -17.1 -15.0 -13.2
Ghana -6.5 -7.5 -9.9 -11.8 -9.7 -9.7 -8.1
Guinea -7.1 -7.0 -23.8 -39.6 -46.7 -52.5 -53.9
Guinea-
Bissau 
-14.9 -23.8 -7.2 -6.5 -6.5 -6.7 -6.6
Mali -8.1 -12.6 -4.9 -5.1 -4.8 -7.6 -7.2
Mauritania -11.2 -2.9 2.9 -18.4 -15.4 -15.3 -13.2
Niger -9.7 -32.5 -21.6 -22.6 -18.9 -18.6 -19.1
Nigeria 14.4 6.8 3.6 3.5 2.0 1.2 0.4 
Senegal -8.0 -4.7 -6.9 -8.6 -8.2 -7.8 -7.5
Sierra Leone -14.1 -34.2 -55.4 -15.6 -8.8 -7.5 -6.3
Togo -9.2 -6.3 -6.5 -8.9 -8.7 -8.8 -9.3
Source: World Bank 
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Table 4: Sub-Saharan Africa: Member Countries of Regional Groupings 
The West 
African 
Economic 
Monetary 
Union 
(WAEMU) 
Economic 
and 
Monetary 
Community 
of Central 
African 
States 
(CEMAC) 
Common 
Market for 
Eastern and 
Southern 
Africa 
(COMESA) 
East Africa 
Community 
(EAC-5) 
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
Southern 
Africa 
Customs 
Union 
(SACU) 
Economic 
Community 
of West 
African 
States 
(ECOWAS) 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Mali 
Niger 
Senegal 
Togo 
Cameroon 
Central 
African 
Republic 
Chad 
Rep. of 
Congo 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Gabon 
Burundi 
Comoros 
Dem. Rep. 
of Congo 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Seychelles 
Swaziland 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Burundi 
Kenya 
Rwanda 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
Angola 
Botswana 
Dem. Rep. 
of Congo 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Namibia 
South 
Africa 
Swaziland 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cabo Verde 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Liberia 
Mali 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra 
Leone 
Togo 
